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[1] For some months now and with special intensity in the past few weeks, a battle 
over legal process – what may or may not the United States do militarily in Iraq 
without new authorization from the UN Security Council, and at what stage and 
under what conditions should a Council resolution give such authorization? – has 
simultaneously become a battle over what words in a resolution will be sufficient to 
count as implicit authorization. The current diplomatic discourse around a new Iraq 
resolution is focussing on one or more "hidden triggers" in the draft text presented 
by the US on October 21. (1)  
 
[2] Having been manoeuvred into going to the UN by the political response to the 
Cheney-Bush-Rumsfeld war drum beat over Iraq, the US continues to maintain 
that, while a new resolution would be desirable as a signal of renewed 'international 
community' resolve, such a resolution is not actually needed from a (US) legal 
perspective. According to the US, prior Council resolutions on Iraq already permit 
states to enforce the Council's disarmament regime. By Monday, October 28, the 
United States was using this claim as a basis for castigating the Security Council for 
dooming itself to irrelevance should it not agree to a text that the US can accept, 
for the US would act on its own views anyway. (2)  
 
[3] However, feeling the heat to a sufficient extent to feel UN cover would be highly 
useful to facilitate that which the US and the UK are already willing – perhaps even 
itching – to do, the US continues to present itself as acting in good faith by 
engaging in a debate over what new action the Security Council should take. It is 
here that the US preference for one resolution and France's preference for two 
meet the world of word politics. 
 
[4] Initially, France led resistance in the Security Council to the United States' 
insistence on a single Council resolution. (3) The US sought a resolution that would 
specify the standards with which Iraq must comply with respect to its 'weapons of 
mass destruction' (WMD) and clearly permit (whether expressly or implicitly) states 
to then respond to non-compliance with force, extending to invasion, without the 
need for any further Council action. In France's view, two stages are needed: a new 
resolution that sets out the standards and then a second resolution authorizing 
force should Iraq fail to comply with the first (and should Council members then 
deem force to be justified). (4)  
 
[5] However, that was then and this may be now. By the weekend of October 25-
27, the world of power politics and the world of language have come together in 
such a way that a mutual saving of face (who has given in to whom?) will still result 
in a final text that leaves space for US interpretive unilateralism. It will surprise no 
one familiar with international politics that it is possible that France is playing a 
double game, according to which it can claim to have stood up to the US 
unilateralist-militarist impulse while knowingly leaving intact language in a Council 
resolution that has in the past been used by the US to justify using force against 
Iraq – albeit in the form of one-off targeted attacks in contrast to the current 
invasion scenario.  
 
[6] This article seeks to lay bare what is at stake with respect to Security Council 
Resolution textual semantics, in light of the interplay over the past decade between 
Council resolutions, a hybrid warning-threat discourse of "serious consequences" 
and aerial bombardments by the US (along with the UK, and, on at least one 
occasion, France itself) of Iraq in 1993, 1997 and 1998. After showing what the 
serious consequences of "serious consequences" could be, I end by arguing that, 
since Council texts are not all-governing but instead are located in a web of 
associated interpretive signals, it is crucial for key states to delegitimize US claims 
to UN endorsement of its war agenda by going on record with their interpretations 
of what the resolution does not permit.  
 
B. The First Hidden Trigger: "Material Breach" 
 
[7] The US draft that began circulating in the week of October 20 refers to Iraq 
being a persistent delinquent with respect to previous Security Council resolutions 
since the end of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. It does this by using a term of art – 
"material breach" – drawn from the law of treaties. Pour memoire, according to the 
law of treaties, a material breach of a treaty by a party to that treaty permits other 
parties to consider the treaty as having been repudiated – whether suspended or 
terminated. (5) In using the language of "material breach", US government lawyers 
and a number of legal academics have presented Council resolutions setting out 
standards and finding non-compliance with those standards by Iraq as creating a 
relationship between the UN Security Council and Iraq that is akin to a relationship 
between parties to an international agreement (treaty). I set out below the 
trajectory of the legal argument that the US and the UK clearly intend to be 
available to them should a new Council resolution on Iraq contain the "material 
breach" language. 
 
[8] In 1990, Security Council Resolution 678 authorized states cooperating with 
Kuwait to use "all necessary means" to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and 
also to "restore international peace and security in the area." (6) After Operation 
Desert Storm succeeded in ousting Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 687. (7) It imposed a cease-fire on all combatants and also 
established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was the 
United Nations' most ambitious and sophisticated monitoring regime to date. 
UNSCOM was charged with the mandate of discerning Iraq's continuing weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) programs and verifying that its weaponry and weapon-
making capacity had been destroyed by Iraq. A comprehensive sanctions regime 
was also associated with the weapons-inspection regime. The removal of sanctions 
was the intended prize for Iraq once it had complied with all requirements to 
eliminate its WMD capacity. In relatively short order, Iraq resisted the UNSCOM 
inspections regime.  
 
[9] Iraq's tactics included engaging in periodic games of brinkmanship with the 
United States and the United Kingdom whenever these states made clear that they 
were willing to employ military force as a response to Iraq's non-compliance with 
Resolution 687. Starting with the United States, some states began to advance or 
accept an interpretive theory that contended that, if the inspection requirements of 
Resolution 687 were "materially breached," then the cease-fire mandated by 
Resolution 687 could reciprocally be considered by states that had been cooperating 
with Kuwait as having been suspended. The consequence of this suspension of the 
requirement to respect the cease-fire would be, according to this theory, that the 
original Resolution 678 would become applicable again, including, in particular, the 
authorization to use "all necessary means ... to restore international peace and 
security in the area."  
 
[10] There are significant problems with the plausibility of this interpretive theory of 
the relationship between Resolutions 687 and 678, not least being the chronological 
problems of Resolution 678 having envisioned a restoration of peace and security. 
Such a mandate, quite clearly, did not contemplate the revision of the status quo 
ante through a comprehensive disarmament program aimed at Iraq. However, in 
the present context, it would be a mistake to focus on the plausibility of the US 
theory of material breach as if it were some kind of ‘pure' legal question to be 
decided in the realm of sound analytical reasoning.  
 
[11] Legal theories and associated specific arguments ultimately achieve validation 
by complex processes of acceptance by and from within relevant communities of 
interpretation. In domestic legal systems, the judiciary is the key (although far 
from only) community whose adherence needs to be secured, or at least predicted, 
but, in international peace and security law, we do not have this luxury. Instead, a 
more diffuse and power-compromised community of judgement is the key 
audience. In matters of military violence, the views of and stances taken by all 
states matter, but, at any given moment, the five permanent members of the 
Security Council and rotating group of ten other states have the power to decide 
whether to endorse or not endorse a given theory. In an ideal legal world, this 
decision would be produced through a process of unforced persuasion but in the 
real normative world of the Security Council, a combination of coercive and pork-
barrelling tactics are often employed to secure ‘acceptance' of powerful states' 
preferences.  
 
[12] Thus it is that context matters. The US "material breach" theory is known 
intimately by all other Security Council actors, not to mention all observing states 
not themselves members of the Council. Leaving in the "material breach" language 
will transform the US arguments from one that was bordering on being a bad-faith 
rationalization of the will to power to being one that can be presented in some good 
faith as ‘law' acquiesced by other law-makers. Council members need only have 
read the Saturday New York Times, in case they were on a break during the 
relevant corridor discussions at the UN on Friday, October 25. "American diplomats 
said this language was central because it could allow them to argue, if Iraq balked 
at the arms inspections, that Baghdad's new violations compounded its past ones 
and nullified the cease-fire agreements that ended the Persian Gulf war in 1991. 
This would open the legal way for military action." (8) 
 
[13] Counting against my double-game fears about France's strategy is the fact 
that France appears to be continuing to resist the US. As of the weekend of October 
26, both France and Russia were circulating their own informal texts as working 
documents, although they have both stopped short of tabling their texts as 
competing draft resolutions. The French draft drops all references to "material 
breach." An unnamed French diplomat presents France's concerns in the New York 
Times of Saturday, October 26, in the following way: "This is war and peace. You 
cannot adopt a text with ambiguities." (9)  
 
[14] The problem is that ambiguities are exactly what the French now seem to be 
willing to countenance. While focussing attention on the material-breach ‘hidden 
trigger', France is leaving in place – and according to news reports, perhaps even 
beefing up – language from the US draft that is conducive to US arguments of 
implicit authorization: the language of "serious consequences." That France knows 
that its own version still contains US-friendly ambiguities is made completely clear 
when the French text is contrasted to the Russian working document. Julia Preston, 
the reporter for the New York Times following the evolving discourse the most 
closely, sees clearly the difference: "The Russian proposal did little to strengthen 
the weapons inspection issue, and included no mention of ‘material breach' or 
‘serious consequences' – that is, no threat of military action."  
 
[15] Meanwhile, at the end of the weekend, Mexico, one of the ten rotating 
members of the Security Council, threw a monkey wrench into the (US) works by 
siding with the French informal resolution, and, Mexico makes clear, with the two-
stage approach that it understands France to still be adhering to. (11) Mexico 
presents itself as a non-syncophantic friend of the US, a friend attempting to 
preserve both a multilateral consensus and a credible international signal of future 
force against Iraq: "‘What we want is a resolution that is approved by all 15 – or 14 
– members of the Security Council,' said [Mexican Foreign Minister] Casteñeda. ‘We 
think that's more important for the United States' cause.'" (12) 
 
[16] Thus it is that the semantic stakes may well come down to whether or not – 
and, if so, how – the Council agrees to include "serious consequences" language in 
whatever resolution is adopted.  
 
C. The Second Hidden Trigger: "Serious Consequences" 
 
[17] In order to drive home why Russia's opposition to "serious consequences" 
language is grounded in a well-justified fear of what use the US and UK will make of 
the language without recourse to any further resolution, I will now proceed to 
excavate for the reader a less-straightforward interpretive evolution within Security 
Council practice. My narrative looks at the effect of warnings from the Security 
Council about the future "serious" or "severest" consequences of continuing non-
compliance with Council resolutions. Although the immediate purpose of this 
upcoming discussion is more explanatory than judgmental, the purpose is indeed to 
get us to the crucial normative issue at stake in the current bargaining over the text 
of a Council resolution: should the international legal community accept warnings of 
unspecified consequences from unspecified quarters as being sufficient to authorize 
states to act militarily in order to force compliance, without having first received 
any further instructions from the Council?  
 
[18] Two preliminary, but crucial, points must be made in order to prepare the 
reader for the nuanced nature of the normative signalling games in which states 
engage in the context of negotiating the space between the Charter's multilateral 
monopoly over the use of force (other than in justifiable self-defence) and the 
reality of unilateral or oligopolistic judgments being made by states wishing, or 
simply being willing, to use force to secure (what are presented as) the ends of the 
international community as a whole.  
 [19] First of all, central to the narrative will be the linguistic acts of two actors — 
the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General — who are not 
expressly accorded an authoritative role with respect to interpreting the meaning of 
Security Council resolutions, let alone a central one. A key part of the signalling 
game at stake in the Iraq context has been the relationship between their 
statements and the formally binding collective acts of the Security Council in the 
form of resolutions.  
 
[20] Second, I have been using the term "warning" to describe the statements 
emanating from the Security Council, and I will continue to use this term. However, 
I do so advisedly, because a significant part of the ambiguity surrounding the 
import of these statements is precisely whether or not they are best characterized 
as warnings or, instead, as threats. The difference hinges on the relationship 
between the actor(s) uttering the threat or warning and the actor(s) that are meant 
to be understood as being prepared to act on that threat or warning should the 
triggering conditions (indicated in the threat or warning) be met. The actor who 
utters a threat will be the actor that will make good on the threat, whereas the 
actor acting on a warning will be different from the actor issuing the warning.  
 
[21] If it is tolerably clear that the members of the Security Council at any given 
time intend the expressions "serious consequences" or "severest consequences" to 
refer to, or at least to include, military measures (in a manner not dissimilar to how 
"all necessary means," as used in Resolution 678, is now understood as a term of 
art for an express authorization to use force), it is by no means clear in which of at 
least three possible ways the Security Council wishes to be understood. The options 
are: (1) as a threat that the Security Council, seized of the matter, will return to it 
and subsequently expressly authorize military measures; (2) as a warning that 
there are some states that will take matters into their own hands and adopt the 
military option (leaving this as a factual statement with no normative stance being 
taken towards this eventuality one way or the other); or (3) as a hybrid in which 
threat and warning join hands in such a way that the signal is that some states will 
adopt this option and that, if this happens, the Council will treat this conduct as 
lawful. It is the third validating signal that transmits a warning simultaneously as a 
threat — and, put differently, as an implicit authorization by the Council for states 
to act as its agent. I now turn to how it is that the combined role — even tag-team 
performance — of the Security Council President and the Secretary-General may 
have helped pave the way in the present Iraq crisis for a threat of future action by 
the Security Council (the first signal) and a warning of future action by unspecified 
states (the second signal) to be converted into this third hybrid signal. 
 
[22] In early 1998, Secretary-General Kofi Annan went, on his own initiative, to 
Baghdad in order to seek concessions from Iraq that would have the effect of 
avoiding military strikes that were being threatened by the United States in 
particular. After Annan's return to New York in March 1998 with the United Nations-
Iraq Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), many in the United States' foreign 
policy apparatus were incensed at his intervention, which had made it politically 
impossible at that time for the United States to go ahead with its military strikes — 
strikes that were viewed as being necessary in light of a persistent pattern of bad 
faith non-compliance by Iraq with the UNSCOM regime. (13) To soften the sting, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1154, in which it was stated that the 
"severest consequences" would result should Iraq not live up to the MOU that it had 
just entered into with Secretary-General Annan. (14) The employment of this 
phrase seemed designed to tap into a discursive precedent that seems to have 
become instantiated as a linguistic convention in prior Security Council practice vis-
à-vis Iraq, albeit not within, but rather parallel to, Security Council resolutions — in 
the form of statements of the President of the Council. Note that, in this regard, the 
Presidency of the Security Council rotates amongst the different member states of 
the Council, with the President's statements being issued, by commonly accepted 
practice, only where the President of the Security Council, at the time, is confident 
that the statement in question reflects the consensus of the Security Council 
members. 
 
[23] On at least two occasions prior to 1998, in 1993 and then again in 1997, the 
Security Council president used similar, while not identical, language when Iraq was 
warned of "serious consequences" should it continue to fail to comply with Security 
Council demands for cooperation with UNSCOM. (15) Following the 1993 warning 
(indeed, only two days later), the United Kingdom, the United States, and France 
went on to bomb Iraqi targets in southern Iraq. (16) Whether or not any firm 
consensus had evolved by 1998 amongst the permanent members of the Security 
Council with respect to at least a de facto acquiescence in recourse to military 
action following a presidential warning of "serious consequences," the 
aforementioned 1998 warning did seem to represent a qualitative shift in the 
Council's linguistic signalling practice, since it differed in two significant respects 
from those of 1993 and 1997 — in both form and content. In terms of form, the 
1998 warning was inserted within Security Council Resolution 1154 itself, rather 
than being articulated at one step removed through the formally non-binding 
vehicle of presidential notes or statements. As for the content of the warning, the 
expression "severest consequences" is obviously an order of magnitude beyond 
"serious consequences." Combining form and substance, an external observer 
would be forgiven for interpreting there to have been a deeper level of collective 
resolve in 1998: if warnings of "serious consequences" outside the body of a 
Security Council resolution could be understood (that is, in the 1993 and 1997 
precedents) as an implicit signal by the Security Council that force may be used, 
then "severest" consequences warned — or threatened — within a resolution must 
a fortiori be an even clearer signal: an implicit authorization. 
 
[24] However, in 1998, matters seem to have changed. During the debate over the 
terms of Resolution 1154, China stated emphatically that the warning of "severest 
consequences" in that resolution would, in China's words, not lead to "automatic 
authorization of the use of force against Iraq." (17) On the surface of things, it 
would seem that China knew full well what normative stakes were involved in 
Resolution 1154's terminology in light of the signalling games of 1993 and 1997, in 
which it, China, had participated. At this point, the role of soloist in the Security 
Council concerto, which had previously been that of the President, was now taken 
up by Secretary-General Annan himself. His solo performance in the interpretive 
tug-of-war over what Resolution 1154 was permitting involved an ABC television 
news appearance. Should Iraq not comply with the MOU he had brokered in early 
1998, Annan was asked, would the use of military force require a new Security 
Council resolution or would Resolution 1154's language be sufficient to allow willing 
states to take military measures against Iraq? In what were obviously very closely 
constructed sentences, Annan noted that the United States had consulted broadly 
throughout the crisis, and this action had resulted in Annan going to Baghdad to 
seek the MOU. Then, he added the following: "The Russians, the French and 
Chinese ... resisted [the] idea of automaticity. And therefore, if the United States 
had to strike, I think some sort of consultations with the other members would be 
required." (18) Some eight months later, in November 1998, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France eventually did decide to use military force on the basis 
that Iraq had continued to fail to comply with both Resolution 687 and the March 
1998 MOU. 
 
[25] For the purposes of the present discussion, the key is to know the extent to 
which the UK and US engaged in consultations with other Security Council members 
before unleashing their bombing campaign in November 1998. All things 
considered, we are probably safe to assume they did. Recall China's own carefully 
chosen words in the debate over the language of Resolution 1154 — China had 
objected to an interpretation of the words "severest consequences," which would 
have permitted an automatic recourse to force — and Secretary-General Annan had 
glossed over that objection by seemingly suggesting that "consultations" would 
satisfy China's concerns with automaticity. To the extent that the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and France did consult prior to their strike in November 1998, did 
they do so in the belief that at some level China had sent a normative signal that it 
understood that force could result without a subsequent, fresh resolution by virtue 
of its own careful choice of words during the debates over Resolution 1154 and its 
subsequent lack of objection — or, at least, objection on the public record — to the 
Secretary-General's interpretive spin broadcast on US television, which was widely 
reported thereafter? 
 
[26] What, precisely, is the relevance of the foregoing narrative? First of all, as I 
hope has emerged with some clarity from the discussion itself, a Security Council-
oriented practice of engaging in layered signalling games blurs with the creation of 
real-world, shared understandings on how to go about interpreting Security Council 
resolutions in which the implicit authorization of the use of force (for example, in 
Resolution 1154) is at stake. Second, as a corollary to the first point, the handling 
of Iraq suggests how the frames of reference within which Security Council 
resolutions are drafted are constantly evolving. Another way of putting this point is 
to say that baseline understandings evolve in such a way that formulations that are 
initially viewed as being opaque by external viewers, and as being coded by internal 
participants, come to take on a clarity. For example, the search for implicit 
authorization of the use of force can evolve from a broad contextual inquiry into a 
simple semantic exercise of identifying a key phrase that has been invested with 
particular meaning at some point in time. So, just as "all necessary means" (recall 
Resolution 678) is now an accepted code for Security Council authorization of 
military force and, as such, is now thought of as virtually an express authorization 
within the language community in question despite no specific mention of anything 
to do with force or military means, the practice of warning of "serious 
consequences" is perhaps on the verge of becoming understood by the permanent 
members of the Security Council to be a warning — or, in line with the earlier 
discussion, a hybrid warning-threat — that future military action may occur without 
a subsequent Security Council resolution expressly authorizing this action. 
Measured against the standard conventions of drafting legal instruments, the 
lawyer concludes that, when the Security Council goes on to use the same language 
again, this use is intentional and interpreters are meant to understand the words in 
the new case as they have come to be understood in light of previous practice. 
 
[27] In light of the just-described practice surrounding past dealings with Iraq, it is 
starkly apparent that Russia is justified in worrying that the US and UK can move 
forward by invoking the "serious consequences" language as code for some kind of 
Council acquiescence, separate from and in addition to the "material breach" 
rationale. By taking care to go through some kind of P-5 or broader Security 
Council ‘consultation' process before striking – strike that: invading – they will build 
on precedent while even more clearly cementing that precedent. 
 
D. Language, Violence and Responsibility: Interpretively Outflanking the US and 
UK? 
 
[28] It has not been my purpose to argue for or against the UN Security Council 
authorizing military action against Iraq – although, given the opportunity, I would 
make the argument that, in the focus on whether or not the US should be allowed 
to act unilaterally, too many are failing to fully engage with the morality and 
wisdom of even a multilateral military campaign in Iraq that is expressly authorized 
by the Security Council. In any case, my purpose has been to attempt to shine a 
spotlight on how the line between Council authorization and individual state 
aggression has been blurred by semantic politics and diplomatic signalling games.  
 
[29] In this concluding section, my concern is to insist on states taking 
responsibility for their involvement in structuring a textual environment in which 
the US is given licence to rationalize its power-based and particular national-
interest calculations in the form of legal arguments. If France (now supported by 
Mexico) intends to allow the US to engage in interpretive unilateralism – i.e. 
allowing the US to say that Council resolutions, especially a new resolution, can be 
interpreted to contain authorization for a single state to enforce those resolutions 
based on that state's own assessments – then France has to be called on this and 
pressured to link the language it employs with its responsibility for violence that 
may eventuate. (19)  
 
[30] As matters have evolved, France, like Mexico, is coming closer to acting in 
concert with the US than acting in opposition to it. Its reasons may be craven (e.g. 
favourable consideration for French oil companies), geopolitically Machiavellian 
(engaging in enough resistance to argue – whether or not believed – in the Arab 
world that they did what they could to resist the US), pragmatic (lessening the 
chances France will become a central target of terrorism), or all combined. Or, a 
core reason might very well be a tactical one: France may see themselves as 
playing, with the US and other partners, a kind of multi-level bargaining game in 
which France considers that, for Iraq to substantially comply with a renewed 
inspections regime, Iraq must actually be made to believe that the US will use force 
if there is clear non-compliance and that there will be some level of an unholy 
alliance with other powerful states in the form of a coded silence that can be 
presented as, at minimum, moral or political tacit approval and, maximally, as legal 
acquiescence.  
 
[31] There is some evidence that the tactical consideration is active in guiding 
France's conduct and that France is willingly seeking to strengthen the hybrid 
warning-threat signal being sent to Iraq. As reported in the New York Times: "In its 
proposal today, France made a concession to the United States by strengthening its 
[France's] own language about ‘serious consequences', and placing it at the end [of 
the draft resolution], a location normally reserved in the Council's resolutions for 
threats to be acted upon." (20) If this is France's game, this too has to be brought 
into the light of day so that all concerned actors understand fully that France is 
knowingly and deliberately participating in a brinkmanship policy. The danger of 
such a policy is obvious: such a policy puts credibility on the line, with the result 
that states engaging in threat or warning-threat strategies face the choice of having 
their bluff called or unleashing a war should Iraq substantially fail to comply. Too 
many have forgotten how, ultimately, the decision of NATO to go to war over 
Kosovo was related as much to NATO's credibility – following employment of a 
threat strategy against Yugoslavia's Milosevic –as to a humanitarian motive.  
 
[32] Based on the foregoing analysis, we will be able to call various actors to 
account for their conduct after the fact – including for their silence in the face of 
knowledge of the import of the textual games they are playing or witnessing. 
However, the goal of this article is to contribute to transparency before the final 
Iraq-resolution text is settled upon – or in the immediate aftermath of a vote when 
interpretive explanations can still play a role in structuring the meaning that can be 
plausibly attributed to the text. By shining a spotlight on the serious consequences 
of "serious consequences", the hope is that key states will be pushed into a mode 
of public justification that will lead to US and UK interpretive unilateralism being 
interpretively outflanked.  
 
[33] There are three groups of states that must be forced to take responsibility. 
 
[34] If France and Mexico do not want to be understood as having not only agreed 
to a hidden trigger but also having helped turn it into a hairtrigger, they must 
either join Russia in opposing the "serious consequences" language or they must 
insist that it stays in on condition that express language links the determination of 
those consequences to a subsequent Security Council process and (as the case may 
be) second-stage resolution. (21) At the very least, France in particular must be 
pressured to state publicly that it does not view the resolution as allowing force 
without a further Council resolution. Even if only one permanent member – e.g. 
France – goes on record as explaining its vote in this way, then it becomes 
correspondingly disingenuous for the US or UK to say they have received 
authorization. Were both France and Russia to say that "serious consequences" 
does refer to military force but is not a coded authorization for unilaterally 
determined exercise of such force, any interpretive unilateralism on the part of the 
US or UK would more clearly stand to be condemned as the aggression it would be. 
Despite the likelihood of a Chinese abstention, it may be that China will join France 
and Russia in such an interpretive statement.  
 
[35] If other Council members – for example, Singapore and Ireland, along with 
Mexico – do not want to endorse interpretive unilateralism, they must cast their 
votes accordingly in full knowledge that they can be accused of having given the US 
and UK tacit approval if they vote for a resolution with either a "material breach" or 
"serious consequences" clause, without there being safeguard language to 
counteract those clauses. Such safeguard language could include the express 
provision for a second-stage Council process, which itself could take the form of a 
revised version of the standard final clause of Council resolutions that says that the 
Council shall "remain seized" of the matter. As things stand, the United States' 
publicly articulated theory of material breach and its more subterranean theory of 
serious consequences do not see this standard final clause as barring individual-
state enforcement action but rather as some kind of pro forma statement of 
ongoing Council attention to the matter – attention that is concurrent to action 
based on existing resolutions but not preclusive of it. Council members have to 
begin to make clear that this standard clause is not empty of content, but signals 
that the Council is the body to decide on what serious consequences shall be absent 
any clear language that it has already delegated that authority. 
 
[36] Finally, there are states that are not members of the Council – states such as 
Canada – whose views also matter. If they are truly concerned, they have the 
means to interpretively surround the Security Council text by providing their own 
view of the contents and limits of the text. The authoritative interpretation 
(including interpretive evolution) of the UN Charter – including those legal acts 
authorized by the Charter – is ultimately in the hands of all member states of the 
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